Farewell Portugal! (English version)

200 years have passed, last May 22nd, over the entrance of the future Duke of Wellington into Spain, leaving Portugal never to return again, symbolically marking the beginning of the glorious allied campaign of 1813 which result would be the liberation of the Iberian Peninsula from Napoleonic rule.

The narrative tradition of the Peninsular War tells us that the duke, as he crossed the rivulet that marks the Spanish-Portuguese border, shouted:

Farewell Portugal! I shall never see you again.

The expression appears for the first time, although simply Farewell Portugal, in the fifth volume of the classic work by Sir William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and the south of France:

«A grand design and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand, Wellington’s veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of twelve victories played about their bayonets, and he their leader was so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand, cried out «Farewell Portugal!.»[1]

This act seems not to fit with Wellington’s personality and the grandiloquence of Napier makes us at times suspect of its likelihood.

Watercourse near Castro de Alcañices, next to the Portuguese-Spanish border, in the path that connects Miranda do Douro to the river Esla.

(Photo: Paulino Preto)

Recently, following a discussion on the subject, Steven H. Smith, collaborator  in the forum of the website Napoleon Series,indicated the work The life of Wellington: the restoration of the martial power of Great Britain, by Sir Herbert Eustace Maxwell (Bart.), where one can find explained the origin of the story and the source used by Napier.

It seems that the story was told to Napier by Sir Rufane Donkin, who heard it told by General Sir Thomas Picton, considered the truth in person. We leave here the quotation of the letter’s excerpt from Donkin to Napier:

«Picton told me a strange story. He was riding with Lord W. at the head of the advanced guard, when they crossed a rivulet which was the boundary of Portugal; on which Wellington turned round his horse, took off his hat, and said 'Farewell, Portugal! I shall never see you again.' This was so theatrical — so unlike Wellington — that I should say at once it cannot he true; but Picton, who told it me, was truth itself" (unpublished letter from Sir R. Donkin to Col. William Napier).»[2]

It is known that Wellington entered Spain in May 22nd 1813 through the border from the Beira to Ciudad Rodrigo, and at that time General Picton was in Trás-os-Montes commanding the 3rd Division, part of the left wing of the allied army. Wellington only unites his left wing on the 30th when it was already in Spain, on the banks of the river Esla. It seems to me that if the story, told in second hand by Donkin, has any truth to it, it must have had taken place in the frontier area between Trás os Montes and Zamora, but not with Wellington at the vanguard of its army.
Napier didn’t lose the opportunity to use the story to ‘gold plate’ his narrative and from there the episode appears described in the numerous biographies of Wellington, as well as in many other works on the Peninsular War.

(Text by Moisés Gaudêncio [read it in Portuguese] | translation by Jorge Quinta-Nova)

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[1] History of the War in the Peninsula and the south of France, por Sir William Napier. 1836, Vol. 5, p. 513.

[2]The life of Wellington: The restoration of the martial power of Great Britain por Sir Herbert Eustace Maxwell (Bart.). (4th edition, 1900), Vol. 1, p. 310.

Wellington's Plan

«I cannot have a better opportunity for trying the fate of a battle, which, if the enemy should be unsuccessful, must oblige him to withdraw entirely.»

According to Sir Charles Oman, the most reputed historian of the Peninsular War, Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Marquess of Wellington, never put to writing and in a detailed fashion his plan for the 1813 campaign. As a result, historians had to resort to Wellington’s correspondence and other indirect sources to try to understand his objectives and the plan to achieve them. Of the result of the work made by Sir Charles Oman a small summary can be provided.

The house where Wellington’s headquarters

was based during the 1812-1813 winter

(taken from http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/virtual/c_freineda.html)

During the winter of 1813, in his headquarters in Freineda, Wellington designed his plan for the campaign he intended to start in the spring.
In his mind was the intention not to repeat the errors occurred during the 1812 campaign, the plan being progressively tuned to the light of events unfolding on the Peninsula, as well as in Great Britain and Eastern Europe.
In Europe, Napoleon’s defeat in Russia lead to the political and military weakening of France and that situation was not without consequences for the Napoleonic power in the Peninsula.
In Spain, José Bonaparte, usurper to the throne, found himself gradually in a more difficult situation since the French armies abandoned the South of the country in 1812, losing important resources for the Spanish government centered in Cadiz. Besides this, the intense activity of the guerrilla groups which fuelled the rebellion in the northern provinces of Spain provoked much attrition and forced the French forces to dispersion. To make matters worse, Napoleon took important military resources from the Peninsula, which he needed to continue the war in Central Europe, further weakening the French power.
On the other hand, Wellington knew well the French situation thanks to the intelligence gathered from the vast amount of captured French correspondence and the action of the Spanish insurgents.
In Great Britain, despite the debacle of the 1812 campaign, the credit garnered by Wellington allow him to continue to enjoy the total support of his government and obtain important reinforcements namely cavalry, from which the allied army had always been in deficit.
In the Peninsula, his nomination as Generalissimo of the Spanish armies in November 18th, 1812 gave him not only the power to directly command the Spanish troops but also the necessary authority to mobilize material resources needed for the military campaign he proposed himself and whose scenery would be the Central and Northern Spain.

Engraved for the Illustrated London News in 1852, after the drawing 
by the Countess of Westmorland of September 1839

(taken from http://www.southampton.ac.uk/wellington/wellington_introduction.html)

The concise words of Wellington himself make known the plan of action he intended to execute in what he considered to be the first part of the campaign. Here are those words, from his dispatch of May 11th, 1813 to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of War in the British government:

«I propose on this side to commence our operations by turning the enemy’s position on the Duero, by passing the left of our army over that river within the Portuguese frontier. (…) I therefore propose to strengthen our right and to move with it myself across the Tormes, and establish a bridge on the Duero below Zamora. The two wings of the army will thus be connected, and the enemy’s position on the Duero will be turned.

The Spanish army of Galicia will be on the Esla on the left of our army at the same time that our army will be on that river.

Having turned the enemy’s position on the Duero, and established our communication across it, our next operation must depend upon circumstances. I do not know whether I am now stronger than the enemy, even including the army of Galicia; but of this I am very certain, that I shall not be stronger throughout the campaign, or more efficient, than I now am; and the enemy will not be weaker. I cannot have a better opportunity for trying the fate of a battle, which, if the enemy should be unsuccessful, must oblige him to withdraw entirely.»[1]

After concentrating the whole army in the right bank of the Douro, Wellington indicates what would be the circumstances dictating his action. However Wellington had already taken a series of measures destined to harness fortuitous favorable circumstances.
Perhaps the most important of these measures was the transference of his main support base from Lisbon to Coruña and other ports in Northern Spain, thus shortening the distance taken by the supplies coming from Great Britain. To guarantee such transference, Wellington asked that the Royal Navy assured the control of the Northern coast line of Spain and the Bay of Biscay, denying access to the French, supporting the Spanish insurgents and his own allied army when necessary.
Another measure had been the request for the raising of a siege artillery train to be sent to him in case it would necessary to invest and assault fortresses.
Finally, having become commander-in-chief of all the allied forces in the Peninsula, Wellington was able to coordinate his effort from Portugal with the action of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish force operating in the Mediterranean coast, important to hold the Armêe d’Aragon of Marshall Suchet in the defense of Valencia, preventing him supporting the French armies to the west.

Wellington’s plans and measures were ambitious and allow the statement the he looked upon the 1813 campaign as a decisive one and that his objective was none other than to finish once and for all with the French power in the Peninsula.

Bibliography:

Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume VI.

The Dispatches of Field Marshall The Duke of Wellington, (…) compiled (…) by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood. Volume X.

Text by Moisés Gaudêncio [ler aqui em português] | Translation: Jorge Quinta-Nova

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[1]The Dispatches of Field Marshall The Duke of Wellington, (…) compiled (…) by Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, volume x, p. 372.

From Douro to Toulouse



Portrait of Duke of Wellington,oil painting,
by Francisco Goya (1810-1812),
National Gallery

200 years ago, in the Iberian Peninsula, there was about to start one more chapter that in many historical traditions is called Guerra Peninsular, Peninsular War, Guerra de la Independencia or Guerre d'Espagne. This chapter would be the last of a drama that for 5 years had the scenario the domains of Spain andPortugal.

A great Anglo-Lusitanian army condenses for the campaign of 1813, but it already exists for 5 years, melting together in the fight against the French armies, whether in the uprisings of the North, in the Algarve and Alentejo, in the ordenanças and militia, whether in the Battles of Roliça and Vimeiro.

It exists in the battles of Porto, of the Amarante bridge and the Talavera campaigns in 1809; it exists during that year in the integration of the Portuguese and British forces, in the translation of it's regulations and joint training.

It is an army that has conclusively proven itself at the height of Buçaco, at Sepember the 27^th of 1810, at the exact moment where Portugal struggled against the most formidable French threat seen so far, experiencing tragedies like Almeida and the devastation o f villages and the fields of the Beiras and of Ribatejo; it exists in the Lines of Torres Vedras, side by side, defending Lisbon, evicting out of Portugal, by at 3^rd time, the proud French Army. It exists during the 1811 campaign, in Fuentes d'Oñoro, Badajoz and La Albuera. It exists, more and more battered and experienced in 1812, in the takeovers of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, in Salamanca, Madrid and Burgos.



The Duke of Wellington & his staff.
Crossing the Bidassoa & entering France, 1813
(private collection)

But in 1813, the troops of all the nations involved against Napoleon in the Iberian Peninsula gather for the 1^st time as one army, under the command of General Sir Arthur Wellesley, by then “Marquess of Wellington”. The ultimate goal of this multinational force is the definitive eviction of the French out of the Peninsula. With the nomination of Wellington as Field Marshall of the Spanish army (Generalissimo), the Spaniards join the British and the Portuguese, becoming one of the most important part of the great allied army.

In the Spring of 1813 starts the gathering of this allied army, 106 701 men strong; they gather in Trás-os- Montes, Galiza and the area of Ciudad Rodrigo. 52 484 British soldiers, 28 792 Portuguese and 25 425 Spaniards, commanded by experienced, and of proven valor, Generals like Beresford, Hill, Picton, Cole, Alten,Clinton, Stewart, Hope, Graham, Conde de Amarante, Lecor, Longa, Carlos de España and so many others.

This campaign starts for the allies with a promise of success, because of the news of the catastrophic retreat of the French in Russia and a new political understanding for the formation of the 6^th Coalition against the French, following their retreat of South of Spain, just as the reduction of the manpower ordered by Napoleon, having a need of veterans in the Peninsula for the re-build of the Grand Armée.

It was the perfect moment for the allied Army to take an offensive strike, becoming part of the greater European fight against the Napoleonic France.

Translated from the original text “Do Douro a Toulouse” by Jorge Quinta-Nova & Moisés Gaudêncio